# THE CHOCTAW REVOLT

## *A Chapter in the Intercolonial Rivalry In the Old Southwest*

By

CHARLES WILLIAM PAAPE

A. B., Northwestern University, 1935
A. M., Northwestern University, 1937

A SUMMARY OF A THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
In the Graduate School of the
University of Illinois, 1946

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The thesis summarized in this text was prepared under the supervision of Professor Theodore Calvin Pease. The subject of the investigation, originally on the broader basis of general intercolonial issues in the Old Southwest on the eve of the Seven Years' War, was suggested by him. His guidance is gratefully acknowledged.

As director of the Illinois Historical Survey, a research department of the University of Illinois, Professor Pease also aided the assembly of necessary source materials by authorizing the acquisition of a complete microfilm copy of the council and legislative journals of provincial South Carolina, an important record in manuscript form preserved in the archives of the South Carolina Historical Commission at Columbia, South Carolina, and of copies of important manuscripts in other depositories. All manuscripts cited in the thesis may be seen in the form of photostat or microfilm copies and transcripts in the possession of the Illinois Historical Survey, Urbana, Illinois.

The committee examining the candidate consisted of Professor Pease, Chairman, Frederick Charles Dietz, Frederick Stanley Rodkey, and Charles Edward Nowell of the Department of History, and Professor John Mabry Mathews of the Department of Political Science.

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# THE CHOCTAW REVOLT

Among the several regions in North America in which French and British colonials prosecuted imperial ambitions in the mid-eighteenth century, the Old Southwest offers unusual opportunities for analyses of the nature of border conflicts in the colonial period of American history. The Choctaw revolt of 1747, representing a major rupture in the defenses of French Louisiana, illustrates well the numerous considerations affecting the Anglo-French intercolonial rivalry during a critical decade.

In the absence of a defined and determined boundary between Louisiana and British North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, colonial governors, charged with the preservation of national interests, could make the most of every opportunity to give substance to conflicting territorial claims. These claims, freely penned in the latter half of the seventeenth century when geographical information was inexact, savored more of political bargaining than of calculated possibilities. Under the circumstances, the defense of a colonial grant might be based on the broad demands of claims or on the narrower requirements of settled areas. But whatever the course of ambition or argument, a governor's success in achieving his objectives was predicated on his relations with the great Indian tribes or "nations" which separated the settlements of the two colonizing powers.

A reference to any of the major eighteenth-century maps of North America will disclose the strategic positions occupied by the sixty-five thousand Indians living in the Old Southwest. The region itself lay wholly between the European settlements of Louisiana and the lower British seaboard colonies. In the mid-eighteenth century the Choctaw were the largest native group north of the Rio Grande, and the Creek and Cherokee were numerical equals of the great Iroquosian empire-builders, the Six Nations.

Fifteen thousand Choctaw, situated in the present east-central counties of the state of Mississippi and bordering counties of Alabama, formed a first zone of influence around the French settlements on the Gulf shore and along the banks of the lower Mississippi. To the north of the Choctaw were three thousand hostile Chickasaw, living in villages located in the present upper central counties of Mississippi and supported by British traders. Some twelve thousand Creek, neutral in the intercolonial rivalry, lived in two divisions to the east of the Choctaw at the confluence of the Coosa and Talapoosa rivers and along the middle courses of the Chatta-

hoochee. The Cherokee, who formed the fourth of the great tribes, were at the headwaters of the Savannah River and among the valleys of the upper Tennessee and its tributaries. The Cherokee, with whom the French of lower Louisiana ordinarily had little concourse, were outside of the currents of the dispute taking as its name "the Choctaw revolt."

The objects of the Anglo-French contest for supremacy in the region had undergone changes during the half-century antedating the Choctaw revolt. The prospect of using Louisiana as a base against the Spanish colonies, notably New Spain—a French idea of the late seventeenth century—had receded into the background, but the use of the Mississippi River as a highway into the rich interior of the continent remained a primary objective of French colonization in lower Louisiana. Preventing British expansion, another of the original aims, became increasingly important as the eighteenth century progressed. By 1745, when the population of the three southern British colonies was already in excess of one hundred thousand persons, Louisiana had nevertheless only reached the mark of 8,830, with approximately one-third of this number living in the upper hinterland within the economic orbit of New France. The British, moreover, had succeeded (in South Carolina) or were succeeding (in North Carolina and Georgia) in developing stable colonial economies while Louisiana annually drew larger and larger sums from the French treasury. The British, notably the South Carolinians and to a lesser extent the Georgians, also found great profit in the trade with the Indians.

The approach of the South Carolina Indian trade with the Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw to a point of maximum development was a factor in the re-emergence of aggressive Carolinian imperialism in the late 1730's and 1740's. In the 1740's the trade was entering its best years. South Carolina and Georgia traders were drawing annually from the Old Southwest the hides of some two hundred thousand deer, offering the Indian hunters in exchange the products of British manufactories and distilleries. Although only a small percentage of the provincial population profited directly from the trade , it ranked as South Carolina's third largest industry in terms of value of commodities exported. The Louisiana skin trade, in contrast, was beset with difficulties. The French trade was chiefly with the Choctaw, who supplied inferior hides, and to a limited extent with the Creek, to whom the French chiefly sold munitions. Except in munitions, a bulky commodity, the French advantage of water communication from Gulf ports to the interior did not prevent the British traders from gaining a virtual monopoly of the Indian trade where competition was open.

Louisiana's difficulties in maintaining trade relations with the Indians of the Old Southwest were due to no single cause. A commonly reported bond of natural sympathy between Frenchman and Indian was in the colony's favor, but the Indians also often told the governors of Louisiana that the "English" offered a wider variety of goods, greater quantities, a constant supply, and lower prices. Britain's advanced economic condition was already telling in commercial competition. The British also had developed a better market for the hides; the French reported that their merchants cared little for the only article the Indian could readily supply. French shipping between the colony and mother country was another reason for weakness. In years of peace the colony was often poorly supplied and in years of war it was cut off for long intervals in spite of regular use of the ships of the royal navy for the transportation of colonial cargoes. During the lean seasons the governors and traders could retail only promises. In the same years, when the Louisiana trade was at a low ebb, the South Carolina exports of deerskins commonly increased.

With the Indians recognizing the maxim that friendship (and consequently success in the intercolonial rivalry) followed trade, the French found the means to offset the British advantage in trade by effective intertribal diplomacy and by tribute in the form of annual gifts. As instruments of diplomacy, the military commanders of Louisiana were relatively more effective than the deputized or specially instructed traders employed for specific missions by the British colonial governors. Louisiana's annual gifts, rising in value from 14,000 to 62,000 livres a year during the 1740's, similarly were not matched by South Carolina's and Georgia's irregular gratuities. By these means Louisiana gained an apparent equality in its contest with a rival that was potentially many more times powerful.

The demands of colonial defense placed a special importance on the goodwill of nearby tribes. It was recognized from the time of the founding of Louisiana that the security of the French settlements was dependent upon Choctaw friendship, for it would have been impossible to maintain the tenuous foothold on the Gulf coast in the face of Choctaw hostility. Within the first years, also, the Choctaw had been organized as a barrier to absorb the shocks of British-led Indian armies attempting to drive the French from their foothold. The Choctaw were thus made the key to Louisiana's defense on the landward side. The tribes friendship had to be maintained, whatever the cost. To guarantee it, Choctaw warfare against the British-supported Chickasaw was encouraged. Then in 1717 the French had taken a propitious opportunity to build Fort Toulouse (commonly called "the Alabama fort")

among the Creek to prevent British ingress among the western tribes. But even though the Alabama fort blocked one of the more important British routes to the Choctaw, the great tribe was from time to time susceptible to the contaminating influence. The Chickasaw wars of 1736 and 1739 were undertaken by the Sieur de Bienville primarily to preserve the Choctaw barrier, although other considerations were of greater importance to other parts of the French North American empire. Fort Tombecbe, erected near the easternmost Choctaw villages in 1736, was designed in part and maintained for the express purpose of closing a British route to the Choctaw and to check, through the diplomacy of its commander, any influence the British might gain over dissentient elements in the tribe. Thus, by 1740, it was clear to the French in lower Louisiana that any sign of dissaffection among the Choctaw augered ill for the continued existence of their colony.

The disaffection of the Choctaw which resulted in the revolt of 1747 represented a problem of long standing. If Fort Toulouse had served to prevent British penetration among the western tribes, the Choctaw and Chickasaw, and if the French had been able to develop the Indian trade more nearly equal to the demand for trade goods, the revolt might not have occurred. Instead, the western tribes had reason to encourage the coming of British traders. Unrest among the tribes mounted during the 1720's, culminating in the symptomatic Natchez revolt in 1729. Shortly afterward, Chickasaw hostility to Louisiana took a new turn when that tribe gave refuge to the Natchez, an act that represented an espousal of the Natchez' cause. By 1732 even the Choctaw were restless. Michael Baudouin, the Jesuit missionary who resided at Chickasawhay, reported that a large part of the great nation was disposed to seek the friendship of the British but had not yet done so because one Red Shoes of Koweh Chito, the most popular war leader of the nation, was restraining them.

The governor of Louisiana, Bienville, relied first on warfare between the Choctaw and the pro-Carolinian Chickasaw to reunite the nearer and more essential nation, but this policy had only temporary success. By 1733 the Choctaw were beginning to look upon the French slowness to avenge the insults of the Natchez as a show of weakness. Red Shoes' loyalty was no longer certain. By 1734 the French position among the Choctaw had deteriorated to such an extent that Red Shoes was ready to call in the Carolinians and their new neighbors, the Georgians.

In the rise of Red Shoes may be observed the emergence of the natural leader bred by a crisis. "Red Shoes" was, of course, a nickname; red shoes or moccasins were the symbolic footgear of village war leaders. War leaders

ordinarily received no recognition other than payments for scalps by the French, but in 1732 in a show of gratitude for having thwarted English intrigue Red Shoes was made a medal chief and given the supervision of eight of the forty-odd Choctaw villages. This overturning of Choctaw governmental custom weakened the authority of the civil leaders, who were insulted when Red Shoes was thus honored. Then, when new French officials attempted to rectify the mistake, Red Shoes turned to the British to bolster his prestige.

The Chicaksaw campaign launched by Bienville in 1736 was primarily designed to maintain the solidity of the Choctaw barrier. Sufficient enthusiasm was aroused temporarily to win back Red Shoes and other dissentient leaders. But the failure of the French to defeat the Chickasaw contributed to a prompt renewal of British partisan activity. Shortages of trade goods again disposed the chafing Choctaw to enter commercial relations with South Carolina and Georgia. Red Shoes personally led a delegation to Charles Town in 1738 to make a trade agreement, promising to double the current volume of the South Carolina trade if the colony would match the annual French present. Again forced to act, Bienville set in motion the second Chickasaw campaign. Failure this second time was mitigated only by success in keeping the Choctaw at war against the lesser tribe during the following years. The war of attrition, designed to diminish the Chickasaw's fighting strength and to increase the dependence of the Choctaw, was highly successful. By the end of 1742 some of the Chickasaw were ready to make peace.

The overtures of the weakened Chickasaw were made to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the Canadian nobleman who succeeded Bienville as governor of Louisiana in early 1743. Vaudreuil entered the negotiations with enthusiasm; it seemed to be an auspicious opportunity to solve the colony's outstanding problem at the very outset of his administration. But the Chickasaw negotiation became entangled in another between the Creek and the Choctaw. Before a year had passed Vaudreuil learned that the Chickasaw proposals were only half-hearted, that they had no intention of abandoning their British connection, and that the Creek and Chickasaw were instead undermining the Choctaw. The situation took on an added aspect of danger because the colonials of both Louisiana and the British colonies had been expecting an early breach in the peace ever since Britain and Spain had gone to war in 1739.

England and France were indeed ready for war in 1740 and had even taken steps to initiate it under certain circumstances prevailing in the West

Indies, but the projects of both miscarried. Soon after the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession, they were drawn into this conflict as auxiliaries but did not participate as principals until the spring of 1744. Nevertheless the war in Europe had repercussions in America even before France and Great Britain formally joined the conflict. Shortages of trade supplies in Louisiana were noted in 1743 and early 1744; by the end of the latter year and in the next the shortages were acute. And almost as soon as the war broke out the British navy and privateers further reduced French shipping. The concomittant decline of Louisiana's commerce with the Indians became the background for an increase of incidents of friction between colonials and natives. Because Red Shoes' loyalty was blemished, he was no longer favored with special gifts. Efforts were still made to keep him well disposed, but in 1745 the soldier-trader who was placed in his village to counteract his dissent violated his wife. There were other incidents. More important, being unable to find the necessities of life in the stores of French traders, the Choctaw turned to British traders who had goods and promised them that their every want would always be satisfied.

Late in 1744 Lachlan McGillivray, a Carolina trader among the Creek and father of the leader of the later Creek confederacy, reported that some Choctaw leaders visiting the Creek had informed him that

> the Chactaw Nation begins to groan under the French Yoak, & long for a Correspondence with the English, pursuant to which Resolution the Chactaw concluded upon a Peace with the Chickasaws . . . One of them (the Chactaw) . . . knew the sentiments of the Nation in General to be such as that he would be very glad to be at a good understanding with the English, & that since they tasted the Sweetness of the English Trade they cannot live contentedly but still long to taste more of it.*

This information was communicated to Governor James Glen of South Carolina, who asked his provincial assembly to enable him to act upon it. The response, a promise of a year's monopoly of the Choctaw trade to McGillivray and a small present to the Choctaw, showed the legislature's almost complete disinterest. Governor Glen, however, seems to have been more deeply interested.

James Glen, a Scotsman educated in law at Leyden, had come to South Carolina as governor in late 1743. He is not known to have had an interest in colonial or imperial affairs before the time of his appointment, but he showed himself an efficient colonial governor and a vigorous imperialist. It

*McGillivray to Glen, Jan. 14, 1744-1745, S. C. Council Minutes, Jan. 25, 1744-1745, Council Journals, 14: 41; South Carolina Historical Commission, Columbia, South Carolina.

seems probable, although it cannot be stated with certainty, that he was already aware of the possibilities of opening trade with the Choctaw, when McGillivray's information came to him. In late 1744, or possibly in 1745—the best evidence supports the former date even though the latter would seem more probable—Glen encouraged the bankrupt Cherokee trader, James Adair, to trade with the Chickasaw and to attempt to open relations with the Choctaw. By his own admission, however, Adair did nothing until 1746. In the meantime, Glen took the occasion of the outbreak of war to project a plan of conquest of Louisiana, based in part on McGillivray's information and other recent accounts of the French colony. But this project does not appear to have been considered except at the moribund Board of Trade.

Between 1744 and 1746 the Choctaw steadily grew more unruly. Peace negotiations with the Chickasaw, which Vaudreuil was now trying to prevent, appeared to be succeeding. In May, 1746, some Chickasaw were visiting the Choctaw in connection with the proposed peace and three of the party were killed by French partisans. The unwanted peace was forestalled, but three months later (in August) Red Shoes' British partisans fell upon three Frenchmen residing in Choctaw villages, killed them, and pillaged the stores of other French traders. The crisis had been reached.

The responsibility for the second incident must be traced to Adair even though Vaudreuil seemed justified by circumstances in his belief that the two incidents were directly related. Adair's account, in which he states that he asked only one French scalp to atone for the recent death of an associate, is substantiated in the report of Jadart de Beauchamps, the investigator Vaudreuil quickly sent among the Choctaw. Adair had taken John Campbell, an old Chickasaw trader who knew the Choctaw well, into his confidence and the two had worked together to subvert the Choctaw. The French scalps were taken to Adair at a time when he was on Creek soil, but because of Creek pressure generated by the French commandant of the Alabama fort was forced to refuse to accept them. Hitherto the Creek had generally aided the British traders attempting to come to terms with the Choctaw, but now the Creek had been informed or had themselves discovered that their coveted balance of power in the Anglo-French rivalry would be endangered if the British should become entrenched among the Choctaw. Henceforth the Creek would co-operate more with the French. Their first act was to help dispose the Choctaw to make an appropriate propitiation to the French.

The rift between the Choctaw factions widened when it became known

that the head of Red Shoes was demanded by the French. Undaunted, the war leader made peace with the Chickasaw in November and sent a brother, Minko Puskus, to Charles Town to bring back traders. Chickasaw traders were already appearing openly in Choctaw villages during the winter of 1746-1747 and the division in the nation showed no sign of closing. When Red Shoes was killed by stealth in June, 1747, the rift was widened. Only clan loyalties seemed to remain, and clan began fighting against clan. In the narrow contemporary usage of the French, this was the beginning of the Choctaw revolt.

By the time Governor Glen learned of the events of 1746 he was already abandoning his erstwhile agent, Adair, and entering a project to engross the Choctaw trade. A new trading company, McNaire and Company, was formed for this express purpose and Glen was its creditor. When Minko Puskus appeared in Charles Town in April, 1747, he was introduced to Charles McNaire. McNaire soon afterward set out for the Choctaw country with an immense cargo and a gift to the value of £1274 (local currency) from the British colony. Minko Puskus also fell in with a project to have the Choctaw destroy Fort Tombecbe, to help the Creek destroy the Alabama fort, to participate in a campaign against the French, and to help South Carolina build British forts in or near his nation, near the Chickasaw, and elsewhere. The assembly's support for this project was anxiously sought by Glen, but even when thwarted he and the provincial council took steps to carry out the plan.

Both the private and public projects failed. Adair, bitter at the treatment Glen was according him, imposed difficulties which embarrassed McNaire's relations with the Choctaw, and the Choctaw were not yet ready to attack the French forts. In late September, however, a party of British partisans raided the environs of Mobile and killed seven persons. Most Frenchmen still remaining in the Choctaw nation now left it, and the outlying districts of Mobile reverted to weeds. Then, late in 1747, when Glen attempted to reconcile the conflicts he had stirred up between Adair and McNaire, he found that he could not satisfy both. By January, 1748, he was compromising his promises to Adair for the second time by illegally granting McNaire a monopoly of the Choctaw trade so long as the latter remained among the Choctaw. The incident involved two irregularly issued proclamations, but it profited no one.

McNaire's second trip to the Choctaw was the high point of South Carolina's part in the revolt. Because of Adair's importunities and his own inexperience he had not profited on the first trip, and in November the Choc-

taw sent him back to Charles Town for more trade goods. Ammunition was especially wanted, for civil warfare had broken out and the French were supplying their partisans liberally. On reviewing this information, Glen disposed the provincial council to send a second great gift—100 guns, 800 pounds of powder, and 1600 pounds of bullets—to the British partisans. Smaller amounts of the same articles were sent to the Creek and Chickasaw to encourage them to renew hostilities. Only a small part of this gift reached the Choctaw. Unnecessary delays and probably even mismanagement by McNaire's company contributed to a weakening of the British interest. One part of the gift which reached the Choctaw became the means of new raids on Mobile and on the German settlements above New Orleans in March, 1748. The latter region bore evidence of the raid as late as 1751 in the form of unoccupied farms. There was another raid on Mobile in November. But the ammunition was soon spent, and the lot of the British partisans grew progressively worse. They were bested in the internecine warfare in spite of the supplies brought in by Carolinian traders who ventured into the nation after McNaire left it the second and last time. After a second trip to the tribe McNaire returned bankrupt and ready to leave the Choctaw to others who might want their commerce and be willing to bear their importunities.

On his side, Vaudreuil waited long without any prospect of success. His demand for the heads of the three ringleaders of the revolt was unpopular, and he had to pay dearly in bribes for what was done. It became clear that even French partisans hoped that their nation could have both French and British traders at their bidding. Before the raids on the French settlements in 1748 Vaudreuil was only demanding that the Choctaw atone for the death of the three Frenchmen and reunite under the old French alliance. After the raids he took a sterner note, demanding that the three villages participating in the raids be destroyed, coupling with it a promise to pay for British partisan scalps at three times the rate ordinarily paid for a Chickasaw scalp. These demands, made in April, 1748, raised the civil war to fever pitch, and when Vaudreuil met the Choctaw again in December they had more than a hundred scalps to lay at his feet. To propitiate the November raid on the German settlements a new agreement to destroy the offending villages was reached. Confident that he could keep his partisans well supplied with munitions, Vaudreuil encouraged fighting to the bitter end.

Vaudreuil was reasoning correctly. The British faction ran short of munitions. An eleventh-hour mission to Charles Town undertaken by some discouraged leaders brought only further discouragement. No gift was voted

until the second month after they departed from the provincial capital, and then Glen delayed sending it in the hope of finding some way that McNaire's company might profit in its delivery. When it was finally delivered in January, 1750, the British faction was already discussing terms of capitulation. The gift, a thousand pounds of powder and a ton of bullets, prolonged the fighting until summer but the end was in sight.

Although Vaudreuil was confident of ultimate success, his terms increased the stubbornness of the fighting. The nation was fast becoming a shambles. Peace was suggested from time to time by the rebels, but Vaudreuil felt he could afford to be firm. When peace overtures failed, the British faction renewed their attacks on Frenchmen. In May, 1749, some Choctaw joined a Chickasaw war party to attack the French settlement at the Arkansas post. The terror of the raid was felt in New Orleans itself. In July some Choctaw killed a soldier and some slaves within two miles of Mobile. But this was a last effort. Six towns were ready to abandon the English and, as proof of their new fidelity, offered to go to war against the Chickasaw. In December, the Sieur de Grandpre, installed at Tombecbe with a generous supply of gifts to encourage the French faction, reported only two villages remained to be subdued. These were the villages to which the third Carolina gift was delivered in January. Against them the nearly reunited Choctaw nation was now set, and in anticipation of an early victory Vaudreuil promised his home government that he would soon be able to lead a "grand army" of Choctaw to exterminate the Chickasaw. Thus would be put to an end the threat of British intrigue among the western tribes.

The final steps were taken in September and October, 1750. The battles at the two villages appear to have been fought after the last members of the British faction admitted defeat. The last British traders had been guided out of the nation by partisans with the promise that their loyalty to the British cause would never die and that they would leave their own nation to settle among the Chickasaw and their English friends. One month later, on November 15, 1750, the nation made its final peace at Fort Tombecbe, agreeing there that in the future (1) any spilling of French blood would be punished by death, (2) the introduction of Englishmen into the nation would be cause for death without rights to revenge, (3) there would be no cessation of attacks on the Chickasaw and on the English traders who supplied them, and finally (4) slaves and prisoners would be mutually restored and all rebel fortifications would be razed. Ostensibly the Choctaw were once more united in the French interest. Peace among the Choctaw came, however, almost exactly two years after the principals in the intercolonial

rivalry, France and Great Britain, had brought the War of the Austrian Succession to a conclusion. The treaty bearing the name Aix-la-Chapelle provided for a return to the conditions prevailing before the war and resulted in the mutual exchange of all conquests.

Vaudreuil brought the Choctaw revolt to a successful end, but it would be difficult to say that Louisiana profited by it. The expenses of the colony were multiplied many-fold during the period of the revolt. Perhaps the best that can be said for the incident is that the civil war which grew out of the revolt discouraged the Choctaw from further open intrigue with the British. The Choctaw were subsequently more amenable to French control although they continued to complain about the inadequacies of the French trade and seem to have learned that their future relations with the British must be cloaked with circumspection. The campaign that Vaudreuil promised his minister took place in late 1752, shortly before Vaudreuil was succeeded by a new governor, Louis Billouart de Kerlerec. The retiring governor's accounts suggest a remarkable success. There were, however, British traders in the Chickasaw villages whose version of the battles suggest the necessity of extensive qualification before accepting French accounts. In the years that followed, the Chickasaw were harassed as never before. Their nation was brought to its lowest ebb on the eve of the Seven Years' War.

When the company of Charles McNaire failed Glen lost interest in the Choctaw. His various attempts to recoup the fortunes of the company were without success. One involved the attempted establishment of trading relations with French merchants at Mobile to secure profits that could not be gained more directly. Another involved McNaire's appearance before the provincial assembly to obtain reimbursement for his losses. In this McNaire was partially successful, but when he arrogated to himself the honor of having effected the Choctaw revolt—a travesty in which the Commons House of Assembly acquiesced, encouraging him to seek reimbursement from the home government in London—Glen broke all pretense of friendship. Glen then used the courts to collect handsomely on his investment in the bankrupt company, but the Choctaw revolt had won him no friends. The provincial council turned against him on issues associated with it, and Adair publicly threatened to air his view of the chicanery to which he had been subjected. Lest McNaire reap the only harvest, Glen demanded in March, 1750, that his former associate's conduct in the delivery of the second present be investigated. McNaire was thereby discredited, but a parallel investigation also unjustly discredited Adair and Campbell, the two men who had probably contributed most to establish the connection be-

tween the Choctaw and South Carolina in 1746. Adair gained only bitter memories for his part, and Campbell was killed by a Choctaw war party that ambushed his path to the Chickasaw in the fall of 1750. Glen himself suffered the displeasure of his superiors for failing to account properly for the delivery of the second present.

The problem of the Louisiana—South Carolina frontier remained unchanged by the rise and failure of the Choctaw revolt. Not until the British gained the Mississippi River as their frontier by the treaty of Paris in 1763 was the problem solved. And 1763 created new conditions which afforded little profit to the imperialists of Charles Town, for the trade which had been their interest was subsequently reoriented to a new hub at Mobile.

The majority of sources necessary for the study of the Choctaw revolt exist only in manuscript form. The most important of these are: (1) the journals of the provincial council and legislative assembly of South Carolina preserved at the archives of the South Carolina Historical Commission at Columbia, South Carolina, although these have gaps which must be filled in by reference to the copies preserved in the Public Record Office at London; (2) the Indian Books, more properly the Books for Indian Affairs, letterbooks which contain correspondence and other texts suggested by the title, also at Columbia, South Carolina; (3) the correspondence emanating from Louisiana preserved in the Series C13A of the section Ministere des Colonies of the Archives Nationales at Paris; (4) the letters of the minister of colonies in Series B, in the same collection; (5) the papers of the Marquis de Vaudreuil preserved among the Loudoun Manuscripts in the possession of the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery at San Marino, California, among which the most important is the letterbook of correspondence with the dependencies of Mobile; (6) and finally, Edmund Atkin's "Historical Account of the Revolt of the Chactaw Indians in the late War from the French to the British Alliance . . . ," preserved in the Lansdowne Manuscripts at the British Museum, London. The printed record of colonial documents affords only a meager contribution. James Adair's *The History of the American Indians* is essential, for most of his historical details are substantiable in spite of confusion and bitterness.

For the review of the European background of diplomacy and policy the standard historical studies were used. The writer also profited from several studies on related subjects which were published during the later stages of the preparation of the thesis.

# VITA

Charles William Paape was born March 8, 1914, at Elmhurst, Illinois.

His academic preparation included attendance at Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, Illinois, and Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, receiving from the latter the degrees of A.B. (Honors), in June, 1935, and A.M., in June, 1937.

He attended the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, after September, 1938. During the year 1940-1941 he was a Fellow in History. Between 1942 and 1945 he was Research Assistant in History, and in 1945-1946 he was an Assistant in History. He has also been employed in the capacity of Assistant Editor of *The American Archivist*, quarterly journal of the Society of American Archivists, since 1939.

He was elected to membership in Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi by the chapters at the University of Illinois.